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ABSTRACT: There exists an organic parallel between rhetoric and democratic governance. This parallel can
best be called “generative logos”—a term used by the Stoics. This helps explain why emotional motivation can,
in democratic arrangements, help create stability. In this sense, it is generative logos that unites Plato and
Aristotle on the instructive potential of rhetoric in the context of direct democracy—a political arrangement
both philosophers, much like they did rhetoric, viewed as being amorphous.
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“The movement of the stream is distinct from the river bed, although it must adopt its winding course.”

Henri Bergson
1. INTRODUCTION
There exists an organic parallel between extemporaneous rhetorical persuasion and the
process of democratic governance. 1 The ensuing analysis aims to show that linguistic
persuasion and democratic governance both share the trait of being amorphous; and while
the fractious nature of democracy caused evident fear amongst Plato and Aristotle, both
philosophers saw effective, non-deceptive rhetoric as a suitable remedy to enhance virtue
amongst the populace. Harvey Yunis points out that the connection between objective
reality and human intelligence is the conceptual context in which Plato sees the only
possibility for useful action. 2 Based on this connection between intelligence and
advantageous action, I have attempted to create a bridge between the rhetorical theories
of the two thinkers by putting forth what can be called “generative logos.”—a term used
by the Stoics. 3
Abizadeh, A. (2002). The passions of the wise: Phronêsis, rhetoric, and Aristotle’s passionate practical
deliberation. The Review of Metaphysics 56.2, pp. 267-296.
2
Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in classical Athens. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, p. 122.
3
It should be pointed out here that logos can be used to connote several meanings. This term can be used to
mean: reason, account, argument, rational discourse, sentence, statement, and/or ratio. In the context of this
paper, I shall use logos to denote both reason and speech.
1

Shirali, N. (2009). Plato, Aristotle, and Generative Logos in Democratic Deliberation. In: J. Ritola
(Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-21), Windsor, ON:
OSSA.
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Connecting Plato’s emphasis on the importance of human intelligence and
psychology, along with Aristotle’s view that rhetoric must not be delivered with a set
structure in mind, one can see that in the thought of both philosophers political speech
must be sensitive to particular cases—in other words, it must be generative in order to be
effective. This assertion has been inspired by the predominant theory in the field of
modern linguistics; in particular, it looks to Noam Chomsky’s contention that language is
creatively produced from human capacities that are innate. Linking Chomsky’s idea of
generative grammar as a model to connect the rhetorical treatises of Plato and Aristotle, I
will demonstrate that unstructured rhetoric can help foster stability in an unstructured
political system, namely direct democracy.4 In this sense, it is generative logos that unites
Plato and Aristotle on the instructive potential of rhetoric in the context of democracy—a
political arrangement both philosophers, much like they did rhetoric, viewed as being
amorphous. Paradoxically, two amorphous concepts, namely political rhetoric and direct
democracy, can be combined to form what may best be called a form of flexible stability.
2. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to enhance one’s appreciation of the following discussion, it is important to place
it in an appropriate historical framework. Becoming familiarized with a thinker’s
politico-historical context would allow one to discern the underlying reasons for their
arguments. It is evident that Plato, through the Phaedrus, and Aristotle both wanted to
express their views on the practical side of things by putting forth their respective
theories on rhetoric. Aristotle thought of political association in democratic form as a
perversion of “Constitutional Government” (politeia), 5 and, together with Plato, sought
an effective way by which this fractious form of government can be “tamed.” 6
In other words, both philosophers were concerned with putting rhetoric in the
service of the polis so that through direct language wise decisions may be rendered and
used to serve communal goals. Aristotle places phronêsis, or practical wisdom, in the
service of ethics; for Aristotle it is phronêsis that allows for the discernment of the ethical
mean. This notion is related to Aristotle’s idea about the end or purpose of the polis. He is
of the notion that the purpose of the polis is the good life—a life in which noble actions
characterize an ethical existence. 7 Furthermore, he saw rhetoric as a practical art that
could be used by virtuous orators to persuade less virtuous auditors. It is important to
point out that for Aristotle there are intellectual virtues as well as virtues of character;
therefore, a person possessing phronêsis could virtuously employ rhetoric to persuade
others who lack practical wisdom. Moreover, he places reason as the archon, or primary
element in ethical decision-making. 8
4

While a complex set of institutions and procedures were created in Athens, there did not exist a
professional state bureaucracy; nor did there exist a legislature or political parties. Decisions were rendered
subsequent to mass deliberation involving six thousand or more citizens. I therefore use the term
“unstructured” to paint a picture of this form of deliberation. I do not mean to denote that no structure
existed whatsoever.
5
Pol. III.7.1279a25.
6
Yunis 1996.
7
See Politics 1280a.25—1281b.10.
8
See Sokolon, M.K. (2006). Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion.
DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press.

2

PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND GENERATIVE LOGOS IN DELIBERATION
Similarly, Gorgias sees rhetoric as “the greatest good,” for it is through rhetoric
that “men win freedom for themselves and rule over others in their own polis.” 9 Linking
Gorgias’ assertion to the importance of context, Yunis presents a representative
summation:
The value of rhetoric—“the greatest good”—is precisely related to the context in which it
operates. Since all official communal decisions in Athens were rendered by democratic voting in
these political bodies, enormous power is potentially available to the politician who has the ability
to influence or perhaps even determine the decisions made in these bodies (G. 455B-56A). In
theory, the position of a skilled rhētōr in a democratic polis approaches the extreme position of the
tyrant who rules his polis absolutely by force (466A-C). In the one case the source of power is
persuasion, in the other the power is based on force […] 10

Let it suffice to say, then, that Plato and Aristotle were both influenced by the same
socio-political context in which the power of rhetorical logos did not go unnoticed.
Needless to day, both were aware of the detrimental effect of deceptive rhetoric, which I
will point to later on in the paper, yet the two thinkers saw the very same instructive
potential in linguistic persuasion—something whose “neutrality,” as the next section will
show, makes it suitable for improving the citizens by enhancing virtue.
3. THE NEUTRALITY OF RHETORIC
Book I of Rhetoric clarifies that an effective rhetorician does not simply “persuade”;
rather, he, possessing the capacity to persuade, must discern the “available means of
persuasion.” 11 In this sense, then, rhetoric is not an art that is concerned with achieving
persuasion within or on behalf of any particular subject; it is rather an art that can best be
put to use by observing each subject or context and recognizing the means by which
persuasion can be accomplished. Aristotle exemplifies this by saying that each art can
persuade on its own particular subject matter; i.e. medicine can persuade on what is
healthy and what is not, geometry about the property of shapes, mathematics about
numbers 12 , etc. But rhetoric, on the other hand, can only persuade on behalf of other
subject matters. By implication this means that rhetoric can be seen to be a neutral art—
an art that can be put to the use of any subject. The reason I have chosen the term
“neutral” here is that the art of rhetoric owes no loyalty to any particular science, art or
ideological intent; it is an art that has a technical aim, i.e. persuasion, but it does not have
a particularized technical or ideological aim.
As Yunis points out, Plato echoes this notion by expressing the failure of rhetoric
to meet the standards of technē:

9

452D, as quoted in Yunis (1996, p. 120).
1996, p. 120. Keep in mind Plato’s sharp distinction between force and persuasion here—a distinction
that will later fit with his revised view on rhetorical logos as an instructive means of realizing the ideal
polis; in the Republic (499D–502A), for example, he makes it explicit that the masses must be persuaded in
order for the ideal polis to be actualized. I will, in subsequent sections of the paper and in line with Yunis’
analysis, point to Plato’s radical shift in rhetorical theory—a shift that is evident by a critical comparison of
Gorgias and the Phaedrus.
11
I.2.1355b.27.
12
Ibid.
10
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Rhetoric fails to meet Plato’s standards of technē because there is no thing whose actual
improvement or benefit is its aim. Though the rhētōr has the polis as the focus of his activity, in
which respect he imitates the political expert, the rhētōr aims only to please the dēmos while
giving the appearance of knowing the actual good and bad. 13

Plato summarizes this argument in the Republic (493 BC): “[The rhētōr] knows not in
the least which of the beliefs and desires [of the dēmos] is honorable or base, good or bad,
just or unjust, but he employs all these terms in accordance with the beliefs of the great
beast [the dēmos], calling the things that please it good and the things that vex it bad.” 14 It
is, therefore, evident that Plato and Aristotle both saw the same neutrality—as defined
above—in rhetorical persuasion. This is one crucial point of commonality that links the
two thinkers on the subject, and which allows for a theoretical convergence to take place.
Let us now see how this point of commonality shows itself in the ability of neutral
rhetoric to deal with concrete, particular cases that arise spontaneously in the process of
democratic decision-making.
4. UNIVERSAL ABSTRACTS AND CONCRETE PARTICULARS
In analyzing Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Politics, and the Nicomachean Ethics, one can establish
a link that would serve to enhance the current discussion. This link is between (1) the
application of abstract universal principles to particular cases and (2) the necessity of
rhetoric in direct democracy. As established in the previous sections, Aristotle sees
rhetoric as a practical art concerned with concrete particulars. What, then, is the
connection between abstract rules and rhetoric? Moreover, if such a connection can be
established, what are its implications for direct democracy?
Before this connection is explored, it would be prudent to provide an example of
Aristotle’s conception of universals and particulars. By referring to law and legislation,
he states:
What is decent is just, but is not what is legally just, but a rectification of it. The reason is that all
law is universal, but in some areas no universal rule can be correct; and so where a universal rule
has to be made, but cannot be correct, the law chooses the [universal rule] that is usually [correct],
well aware of the error being made. And the law is no less correct on this account; for the source
of the error is not the law or the legislator, but the nature of the object itself, since that is what the
subject-matter of action is bound to be like. Hence whenever the law makes a universal rule, but in
this particular case what happens violates the universal rule, here the legislator falls short, and has
made an error by making an unconditional rule. Then it is correct to rectify the deficiency; this is
what the legislator would have said himself if he had been present, and what he would have
prescribed had he known…this is the nature of what is decent—rectification of law in so far as the
universality of law makes it deficient. This is also the reason why not everything is guided by law.
For on some matters legislation is impossible, and so a decree is needed. For the standard applied
to what is indefinite is itself indefinite. 15

Through this passage Aristotle puts forth two main arguments. The first is that the
incapacity of universal law—as reflected through its unconditionality—to deal with
certain concrete cases renders it deficient. The second argument is the implication of the
13

1996, p. 124.
As quoted in ibid.
15
Nicomachean Ethics.5.10.1137b12-30, as quoted in Abizadeh (2002, p. 270).
14
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first in the sense that this deficiency makes its “rectification” just. Furthermore, this
passage corroborates the view that abstract reason—because of its fixity and insensitivity
to particulars—is inadequate in issuing determinate judgments in concrete cases. 16
Therefore, it must be the case that practical reason dealing with particular cases, as
opposed to abstract reason that is deficient in doing so, cannot be broadly codified as a set
of practical principles. 17 If practical reason were to be codified in such a way, then it
would also be rendered “deficient” because of its uncompromising inflexibility toward
concrete particulars.
Since in Ancient Athens law was written and codified, the application of practical
reason to particular cases—at times in violation of universal abstracts—was made to be
an inevitability. If particular cases are unavoidable, and if abstract reason is deficient in
its application to these cases, then the application of practical reason to the particulars is
also unavoidable. Now, if particular cases are also inevitable in the context of direct
democracy, then the application of practical reason—through rhetoric—suited to these
cases is also inevitable. Hence, universal principles and abstract reason make the
applying of praxis to concrete particulars necessary and unavoidable.
In his analysis of Plato’s justification of legal preambles, Yunis points to a similar
indication in the Laws:
Plato begins his justification of legal preambles by admitting a suggestion from the poets (719CE). Poetry possesses the power to make itself understood in a way that law fails to do. Poets excel
at portraying particular circumstances; and the meaning of a poet’s terms becomes evident with
reference to the particular circumstances that the poet portrays. For example, what a poet means by
“funeral” is made clear by the particular funeral that is portrayed. The law, on the other hand,
utters its commands without regard for particular circumstances and without defining its terms or
referring to illustrative examples. To the extent that it does not explain what it means, the law is
incomplete. 18

Plato’s notion of technē, which can be defined as the scientific, empirical application of a
particular body of knowledge to a particular task, “provides the link between any
concrete activity (politics, in this case) and objective reality.”19 While Plato has Socrates
assert that rhetoric is not a technē and compares the rhētōr to a cook who is more
concerned with flattery than improvement, he does make it clear that applying knowledge
to specific tasks is necessary for achieving excellence. This point will become relevant as
I will turn to Plato’s radical shift toward viewing rhetoric. In order for the connection to
be made more effectively, let us first see the parallel between rhetoric and practical
decision-making in democratic form.
5. RHETORICAL PERSUASION AND DEMOCRATIC DECISION-MAKING: THE
ORGANIC PARALLEL
The three elements that constitute what I will here refer to as the “trinity” in rhetoric are:
character (ethos), emotion (pathos), and reason/speech (logos). Abizadeh has proposed
16

Ibid, p. 269.
Ibid.
18
1996, p. 219.
19
Ibid, p. 122.
17
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that there exists a parallel between rhetoric and practical deliberation in the sense that
practical deliberation—like rhetoric—cannot only rely on logical demonstration
(apodeixis) because character and emotion are “constitutive features of [its] process.” 20
He correctly reminds us that in the context of direct democracy, the character of the
speaker and the emotions of the audience play an elemental role in practical speech. For
this reason, Abizadeh rightly emphasizes that “passionate political [speech] and judgment
are unavoidable in democracy […]” 21 The assertion that apodeixis alone cannot always
achieve persuasion is made evident by Aristotle’s discussion on the function of rhetoric.
According to his assertion, this function is to deal with various subjects of debate and not
to forget that it must persuade audiences that are incapable of understanding complicated
arguments at a glance and who are unable to follow a long line of reasoning. 22
What Aristotle is essentially saying is that in the context of direct democracy, the
reality is that the audience that needs to be persuaded is not expected to possess the
highest analytical ability; by implication, then, the next avenue that can and will be
exploited by the rhetorician is to achieve persuasion through an appropriately suitable
means. For this reason, therefore, apodeixis alone does not always guarantee persuasion.
This is not to say, however, that demonstration is not an effective method of winning the
favour of the judge; Aristotle is simply arguing that using rhetorical methods suitable for
the masses is a constitutive component of persuasion.
What can be determined from the parallel drawn between rhetoric and democratic
decision-making is that they are both amorphous, meaning they do not have a particular,
discernible structure. It is this similarity that may explain why the noun rhētōr is
translated as both “speaker” and “politician.” This inextricable link between the
shapeless, neutrality of rhetoric and the unstructured nature of practical deliberation is
crucial in understanding the conceptual bridge between the rhetorical theories set forth by
Plato and Aristotle. This link will become clearer with the next section, which will
outline my idea of generative logos.
6. GENERATIVE LOGOS
The current discussion, I believe, would be enhanced by referring to a series of
groundbreaking and revolutionary ideas in the fields of linguistics and psychology and
incorporating these ideas into my analysis of rhetoric in the context of democracy.
The Nature of Human Intelligence
In the late sixteenth century the Spanish physician Juan Huarte initiated an intriguing
investigation into the nature of human intelligence. In his Examen de Ingenios, he
discovered the interesting possibility that the word ingenio (intelligence) seems to share

20

2002, pp. 268, 276-280. While Abizadeh maintains that there exists a structural parallel between
phronetic deliberation and the art of rhetoric, I, due to the evident absence of structure in extemporaneous
political speech, prefer the term “organic.”
21
Ibid, p. 267.
22
Rhet.I.2.1357a.

6

PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND GENERATIVE LOGOS IN DELIBERATION
the same root as three Latin verbs: gigno, ingigno, and ingenero, which mean “engender”
or “generate.” 23
Normal human intelligence, he argued, is a generative power; by this he meant
that normal human minds are such that “assisted by the subject alone, without the help of
anybody, will produce a thousand conceits they never heard spoke of…inventing and
saying such things as they never heard from their masters, nor any mouth.” 24 Chomsky
goes on to reiterate Huarte’s postulation by emphasizing that
[…] [the mind] is capable of generating new thoughts and of finding appropriate and novel ways
of expressing them, in ways that entirely transcend any training or experience. 25

This is, in essence, what Huarte meant when he proposed his theories on the nature of
human intelligence as it relates to speech. In addition, Huarte was one of the first thinkers
who significantly influenced Chomsky in his development of transformational-generative
grammar in the 1950s—a development that culminated in the Chomskyian Revolution,
which radically transformed the study of linguistics.
In his investigations, Huarte goes on to classify human intelligence in three
categories: (1) “docile wit”; (2) normal human intelligence; and (3) true creativity. 26 He
classifies these levels of intelligence from the lowest to the highest, meaning from the
least to the most creative. In his discussion of docile wit, Huarte explains that in this
category what is transmitted through the senses is all that exists in the mind. According to
Huarte docile wit is, therefore, a submissive, tame, and obedient level of intelligence.
The second level of human intelligence is that alluded to at the outset, namely that
which allows humans to
[…] [make] use of the data of sense but going on to construct a cognitive system in terms of
concepts and principles that are developed on independent grounds; and [that which] is capable of
generating new thoughts […] 27

The third level of intelligence essentially refers to a type of creativity and
innovative imagination that transcends normal intelligence and may, Huarte felt, involve
“a mixture of madness.” 28 In hypothesizing this level of wit, Huarte has in mind a
combination of ingenious and inventive imagination—a level of intelligence that “[…]
without art or study [can] speak such subtle and surprising things […] that were never
before seen, heard, or writ, no, nor ever so much as thought of.” 29 As a physician, Huarte
naturally had an intrinsic interest in pathology. In particular, he maintains that the most
severe form of condition as it relates to intelligence is being restricted to the lowest of the
three levels.

Breviarios del Pensamiento Español (1944, Ediciones FE-MCMXLIV: Madrid), Doctor Huarte de San
Juan, seleccion y prologo de Emiliano Aguado, p.25. Also see Chomsky, N. (1972). Language and Mind.
New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Atlanta: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 9.
24
As quoted in Chomsky (1972, p. 9).
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
As quoted in ibid.
29
As quoted in ibid.
23
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For Huarte, the docile wit renders a person “incapable of generation.” 30 Being of
the notion that language is innately generated through the mind’s internal resources,
Huarte maintains that it is therefore an index of intelligence. While Chomsky contends
that Huarte’s insight provides a useful framework for psychological theory and
linguistics, it can also be linked to the current analysis on political oratory; the link,
however, will be made subsequent to a brief allusion to Chomsky’s theory of
transformational-generative grammar—a theory that greatly influenced my own idea
about generative logos.
The Chomskyan Revolution in Linguistics
Chomsky’s groundbreaking theory on generative grammar was partly inspired by what
Huarte and others had proposed. He was inspired by the theories of the Port Royal
grammarians who, under the influence of Descartes, emphasized the creative aspect of
language. Moreover, Chomsky was motivated by the linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt
(1767-1835), who instigated a search for grammatical rules that would be universal. In
essence, then, the stage for the development of Chomsky’s theory had already been set;
his contribution to the field of linguistics, however, was the result of the mathematical
precision he attached to his theory.
The essence of generative grammar is that it emphasizes inherent creativity in
human language. 31 The theory basically re-emphasizes the words of the Port Royal
Grammar; that the human mind, possessing normal intelligence, is intrinsically capable
of producing an infinite number of expressions and utterances that do not resemble one
another. 32 At core, the theory asserts that generative grammar “makes infinite use of
finite means,” which in turn makes inventions “by which we construct from twenty-five
or thirty sounds an infinity of expressions […]” 33 Transformational-generative grammar
eventually came to dominate linguistics—a position that had previously been held by
structuralist linguistics. The structuralist study of language essentially involved
separating and categorizing language data into patterns. This approach organized
language data into levels of structure and restricted itself to empirical observations.
Human Intelligence, Generative Grammar and Political Oratory
Linking the aforementioned ideas in the fields of psychology and linguistics to the current
analysis on rhetoric presents an interesting opportunity. Before the link is explored, it
would be prudent to make some clarifications. Firstly, Chomsky’s theory on language is
simply concerned with producing language in the general sense, i.e. producing language
that is grammatically sound; it is not concerned with any issue that goes beyond the
bounds of linguistics and psychology. His theory, therefore, is not the basis of the ensuing
analysis; it simply provides for a valuable paradigm by which an interesting outlook on
political oratory can be explored.
30

As quoted in ibid, p. 10.
See Syntactic Structures, (The Hague: Mouton, 1957); also C.P. Otero (Ed.) (2004), Noam Chomsky:
Language and politics. Oakland & Edinburgh: AK Press, pp. 75-101, 214-215.
32
Chomsky (1972, p. 21).
33
Ibid.
31

8

PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND GENERATIVE LOGOS IN DELIBERATION
It is my view that rhetoric must necessarily make use of “generative logos” based
on two elements: (1) it must be adaptive to the particular context; and (2) it must be
creative. It therefore makes generative use of intelligence and knowledge articulated
through the appropriate type of speech, with its style, volume, etc. suitable for the
particular context. Throughout this paper it has been made clear that Aristotle emphasized
the importance of practical effects; for example, it has been shown that, in his view,
political oratory is concerned with utility.
Furthermore, it has been shown that Aristotle postulates on the elements of
effective rhetoric through a discussion of style and purpose of rhetoric; but he does not
provide a set of rigid rules that can be universally applied to every particular context. He
in fact makes it clear that the skilled speaker must first discern the means of persuasion in
every case he encounters. This involves familiarizing one’s self with the beliefs, customs,
and culture of the audience. In the words of Richard Rorty, “All that can be done to
explicate ‘truth,’ ‘knowledge’ […] is to refer us back to the concrete details of the culture
in which these terms grew up or developed.” 34 In other words, truth and knowledge, at
least for Rorty, are context-specific and not universal.
Aristotle’s description of the appropriate form of prose takes into account the
advantages of creativity in rhetoric. He maintains that the creative, free-running prose is
to be preferred over the rigid, structured type of oratory that is incapable of adapting to
particular contexts. In discouraging a structured approach to speech, he states:
The metrical form [of prose] destroys the hearer’s trust by its artificial appearance, and at the same
time it diverts his attention, making him watch for metrical recurrences […] Prose, then, is to be
rhythmical, but not metrical, or it will become not prose but verse. It should not even have too
precise a prose rhythm, and therefore should only be rhythmical to a certain extent. 35

My principal aim here is to show that there is no set pattern in political oratory; rather,
every speech, as Huarte, von Humboldt and Chomsky contended, is generative.
Aristotle’s elaborate description of the different variations of oratorical style simply sheds
light on some of the methods he thinks are useful; this does not mean, however, that
successfully arousing anger in one context using the “heroic rhythm” 36 would also
produce the same outcome in another context. This, I believe, is not only because
different audiences have different customs and beliefs, but also because in the context of
direct democracy the goals and interests of the dēmos are always changing. Political
oratory, therefore, must adapt to the inconstancy of the masses and must do so with
neutrality. Rhetoric cannot possibly accomplish the task of effecting persuasion in every
context without the ability to adapt and to do so with creativity.
My concern here is first with understanding and second with will—the two basic
constituents of the human mind. 37 In emphasizing the importance of generative logos,
Aristotle contends that:

(1982). Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays (1972-1980). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
p.173.
35
Rhet.III.7.1408b.25-30, emphasis mine.
36
See Rhet.III.7.1408b.30-35.
37
Chomsky (1972, p. 6).
34
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Your language will be [appropriate] if it expresses emotion and character, and if it corresponds to
its subject […] To express emotion, you will employ the language of anger in speaking of outrage;
the language of disgust and discrete reluctance to utter a word when speaking of impiety or
foulness; the language of exultation for a tale of glory, and that of humiliation for a tale of pity;
and so in all other cases. This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe in the
truth of your story: their minds draw the false conclusion that you are to be trusted from the fact
that others behave as you do when things are as you describe them; and therefore they take your
story to be true, whether it is so or not. 38

Aristotle’s allusion to utilizing various types of language based on the particular context
is indicative of his emphasis on the importance of employing an adaptive, innovative
form of oratory. Furthermore, employing this approach allows for language to improve
what W.H. Thorpe has termed its “purposive” character in that
[…] there is nearly always in human speech a definite intention of getting something over to
somebody else, altering his behavior, his thoughts, or his general attitude toward a situation. 39

Thorpe’s analysis here can be related to the current examination of rhetoric in direct
democracy in the sense that the masses, with all their different emotions and changing
lifestyles, are virtually inconstant and unstable; therefore, logos finds itself most effective
when it can adapt to different particular contexts. Moreover, as the Cartesian discussion
on language and the limits of mechanical explanation contended, one of the properties of
the use of language is, parallel to Aristotle’s contention above, its “appropriateness to the
situation.” 40
Dialectical Discourse and Instructive Persuasion: Plato and Generative Logos
Yunis (1996) presents an illuminating analysis which points to a crucially fundamental
shift evident in Plato’s thinking on rhetoric. In the Phaedrus, Plato postulates a technē of
discourse that is both universal and which presents an alternative to the unquestionable
dichotomy of Gorgianic rhetoric and dialectical Socratic discourse. In the words of
Yunis:
Plato outlines a universal technē of discourse which is a new alternative to the absolute dichotomy
of Gorgianic rhetoric and Socratic discourse that shapes the pessimistic argument of the Gorgias.
Combining rhetoric and instruction, the new technē makes conceivable both mass political
instruction of the sort merely postulated in the Gorgias and the idealized philosophical relation of
teacher and student represented by Socrates and Phaedrus. In his subtle web of argument, drama,
and allusion, Plato is claiming that the affective and instructive elements in both philosophy and
rhetoric are, in spite of numerous superficial differences essentially the same; hence the one
overriding technē. 41

This passage points to a noticeable and important change, which can only be made more
clear by looking at Socrates’ words in the Apology:

Rhet.III.7.1408a.10-25.
As quoted in Chomsky (1972, p. 68.)
40
As quoted in ibid, p. 12.
41
P. 173.
38
39
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I do not know, men of Athens, how my accusers affected you; as for me, I was almost carried
away in spite of myself, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, hardly anything of what they said
is true. Of the many lies they told, one in particular surprised me, namely that you should be
careful not to be deceived by an accomplished speaker like me. That they were not ashamed to be
immediately proved wrong by the facts, when I show myself not to be an accomplished speaker at
all, that I thought was most shameless on their part—unless indeed they call an accomplished
speaker the man who speaks the truth. 42

Subsequent to this introduction, Socrates pleads with the jury not to pay attention to his
use of language in his defence. Rather, he asks that the jury pay due attention to whether
or not what he is about to say is just, “for the excellence of a judge lies in this, as that of a
speaker lies in telling the truth.” 43 It is necessary to theorize as to why Socrates believes it
is necessary to emphasize the use of language in the trial; moreover, it is interesting to see
that he chooses to make this emphasis at the very beginning of his apology. It is clear, I
think, that Socrates had been aware of the great oratorical skill used to mount the lies
against him. Indeed, it must have made a powerful impact on him—an impact powerful
enough to incline him to begin his defence by referring to it. While his accusers had
apparently discerned the means of persuasion against him, Socrates was only concerned
with the truth—an outlook that would eventually lead to his defeat and, consequently, to
his death.
It is now necessary to reconcile Plato’s conceptual shift with Socrates’ assertion
that rhetoric is not a technē. This can be a rather tricky task, but can nevertheless be
achieved. The key to making this connection is by looking at the controversy on whether
or not all logos is necessarily deceptive. 44 G.B. Kerferd contends that in defence of
Helen 45 Gorgias implies non-deceptive logos because of his insistence on the truth of his
appeal. 46 The absolute Gorgianic view that all logos is necessarily deceptive would, by
implication, mean that all logos is based on belief (doxa) as opposed to imparting
knowledge (epistēmē). In the Gorgias, however,
[…] Plato does not allow Gorgias to doubt even momentarily that instructive discourse exists and
that this discourse imparts reliable knowledge as opposed to unreliable belief (453D-55A). Plato’s
Gorgias is happy to acknowledge the instructive discourse of experts, though he opposes and
subordinates this discourse to rhetoric (455DE, 456B) […] In the dialogue Gorgias claims only
that some logos—rhetoric of course—is deceptive. 47

Plato’s revised view toward the Gorgianic view of discourse can be summarized by three
elements: 1) revising the Gorgianic account to the extent that logos is not always
deceptive; 2) emphasizing the instructive potential of non-deceptive logos applied
through technē; and 3) positing a clear and unmistakable distinction between the nature
and characteristics of the two types of logos (i.e. deceptive and non-deceptive). 48

42

17b-c.
Ap.18.
44
See Yunis (1996, p.133).
45
Helen 2, 21.
46
See Kerferd (1981). The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 78-82; also
Yunis (1996, pp.133-135).
47
Yunis (1996, p. 134).
48
Yunis (1996, pp. 134-135).
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An important point is in order here. The second element above resolves the
paradox that Socrates generates when he asserts that rhetoric is not a technē; it does so by
clarifying that it is the combination of non-deceptive logos and technē that constitutes
Plato’s revised view—it is not the case that Plato now sees rhetoric as a technē; rather, his
revised account of discourse simply puts the power of non-deceptive rhetorical logos at
the disposal of the political expert (technikos), whose aim, much like that of a physician,
is to authoritatively impart instructive knowledge. Plato, therefore, has afforded himself
the opportunity to revise his view on logos while not abandoning his position that rhetoric
does not qualify as a technē. This makes his revised account compatible with the crux of
Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric. This compatibility, as we will now see, can be
characterized through the idea of generative logos.
In the Phaedrus Plato rejects the unconditional dichotomy between rhetoric and
instruction. In doing so, he presents crucially important insight—at times with subtlety—
that must be taken into account. This insight, as it relates to the current discussion, can be
summarized in two elements: 1) the advantages of flexibly extemporaneous speech over
written speeches; and 2) the practical import of creatively adaptive language.
In the dialogue Lysias is defeated by Socrates in a contest of epideictic (display)
oratory. While Lysias is not present at the contest, his previously-composed speech is
read by Phaedrus. At the conclusion of the contest it has become clear that Socrates has
displayed superior skills. This is where an important exchange pertaining to speaking
extempore and written rhetoric ensues. Phaedrus, wanting to save Lysias from further
competition with Socrates, says that Lysias has already been pointed to as a logographos,
or speechwriter. Because speechwriting in Athens was negatively viewed as the selling of
a necessary political skill, Phaedrus goes on saying that Lysias may not want to engage in
any more speechwriting in order to avoid injuring his reputation any further.
Because of the fact that logographoi, or speechwriters, composed rhetoric for
political use while not themselves being accountable to the dēmos, politicians of the
period used logographos as a label to impugn opponents. 49 What Phaedrus tells us with
regard to politicians is correct: they kept away from professional speechwriting for the
purposes of litigation and “always tried to give the impression of speaking extempore
whenever possible.” 50 While Phaedrus and Socrates both know that the excuse provided
for Lysias is not enough to save him from further competition, the point of the exchange
in this part of the Phaedrus is nonetheless significant. Is Plato trying to point to the reality
of democratic politics whereby extemporaneous speech is necessary to effect persuasion
amongst the dēmos?
If one looks at the context of the period, along with Plato’s view that the dēmos
must be persuaded in order to realize the ideal polis,51 I believe the question above can
be answered in the affirmative. While the exchange between Phaedrus and Socrates
expresses the idea that speechwriting has a negative connotation when used for
litigation, 52 the two converge on the idea that the criterion that should be used to judge
whether or not a discourse is praiseworthy or blameworthy ought simply be whether it is
good or bad. The dialogue in the Phaedrus, therefore, is not meant to attach derogatory
49

Yunis (1996, pp. 174 – 175).
Ibid, p. 175.
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Republic, 499D—502A. Also see Yunis (1996, p. 168).
52
Phdr. 258D.
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connotations to written discourse per se; Plato simply means to express the idea that in
the political context of Athens it was more persuasive to speak extempore during public
deliberations; the reference to the pejorative view associated with written rhetoric is a
reflection of the political circumstances affecting Plato’s thought. Alcidamas reflects the
same notion in his essay On Those Who Write Written Speeches, or On the Sophists. He
tells us that the character of a written speech—due to it having been pre-composed—will
stir distrust in the audience, portray the speaker as being insincere, and consequently fail
to effect persuasion:
[W]hen speeches are fashioned precisely with respect to their words, resembling poems more than
logoi, have abandoned spontaneity and verisimilitude, and appear to be shaped and composed with
much preparation, they fill the minds of the listeners with disbelief and resentment. 53

Analyzing the dialogue in the Phaedrus yields the conclusion that
extemporaneous speech is more persuasive not because speaking extempore is inherently
superior but because of the negative connotations associated with pre-composed rhetoric
in the context of political deliberation. The conclusion, therefore, is that: 1) speaking
extempore is not intrinsically superior to written discourse, but 2) it is more suitable for
the context of democratic governance whereby the speaker must persuade the dēmos and
is accountable to them; because of this, impromptu speech (or, at least seemingly
extemporized speech) is better suited for the purpose of persuasion.
Let us now turn to the point of commonality between Plato and Aristotle as it
would relate to the creative production of language suitable for concrete, particular cases.
In the Apology Socrates laments that the pursuit of truth must not be with the use of
“embroidered and stylized phrases” 54 but, rather, through “things spoken at random and
expressed in the first words that come to mind.” 55 While Socrates’ words here could
certainly be linked to the dialogue in the Phaedrus about extemporaneous speech and
written rhetoric, I believe there is also an implication suggesting the importance of
spontaneous, generative language in persuasively imparting knowledge. Let us first point
to Plato’s amalgamation of rhetoric and substantial argument, as captured in the
following passage from the Republic. (The italicized words indicate how Plato masks the
argument with a rhetorical appeal):
The many will have a different opinion [about philosophers] if without contentiousness but
soothingly and by destroying the slander against love of learning you point out whom you mean
by philosophers, and you define their nature and character as we just did, so that they do not
believe you mean those [sophists] whom they are thinking of. 56

On the Sophists 12; translation adapted from Michael Gagarin, trans., On Those Who Write Speeches, or
On Sophists. In: M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff (Eds.) (1995), Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to
the Sophists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 276-283, as quoted in R. Graff (2005). Prose
versus Poetry in Early Greek Theories of Style. Rhetorica, Vol. 23, Issue 4, p. 311, emphasis mine.
54
17c.
55
Ibid.
56
499E – 500A, as quoted in Yunis (1996, p. 170); the idea that the italicized words in this passage express
Plato’s rhetorical appeal is borrowed from Yunis.
53
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Through this passage, Yunis maintains, Plato is in effect borrowing the sophist’s method
in order to “mold the audience to his purpose.” 57 In other words, Plato is advising that the
auditors be approached with a soothing attitude so that the speaker can create goodwill
amongst them. Having accomplished this, the speaker can create in the audience a feeling
that they would want to be persuaded. In effect, what Plato is communicating here is
strikingly similar to what Aristotle says about the importance of the character of the
speaker and putting the audience in the right frame of mind. 58 What the speaker ought to
do, Plato communicates, is to evoke gentleness (praotēs) in the audience so that the
speaker can in effect persuade them to be persuaded.
The emphasis both Plato and Aristotle place on this aspect of effecting persuasion
indicates they both saw the adaptability of logos to a particular audience as being
important. In postulating what Plato implies about the common human capacity to be
instructed, Yunis puts forth the idea of “collection-and-division,” which encapsulates
Plato’s notion of a human being “passing from many perceptions to a unity collected
through reasoning.” 59 Furthermore, the speaker puts the idea of collection-and-division to
use “in order to define each thing and make clear whatever it is that one wishes to instruct
one’s audience about on any occasion.” 60 Plato’s reference here to the importance of the
adaptability of instruction to each particular occasion is crucial in understanding the link
between his theory and that of Aristotle. Moreover, it suggests that the spoken word,
which must be generative if it is to be effective, is more suitable for political instruction
than the written word, which is fixated and hence less sensitive to the particular case at
hand.
In connection with his notion that the rhētōr must create goodwill amongst the
auditors, Plato tells us that the effective rhētōr must gain knowledge on the nature of the
human soul and its capacities. 61 This comes through in a rather difficult passage where
Plato amalgamates rhetoric and psychology:
Having classified the types of speeches, the types of soul, and the various ways in which souls are
affected, he [the rhetorical teacher] will explain the reasons in each case, suggesting the type of
speech appropriate to each type of soul, and showing what types of speeches necessarily persuade
and fail to persuade each type of soul, and why. Since the power of speech is in fact a guiding of
the soul (psychagōgia), the aspiring expert rhētōr must know what types of soul there are. Now
there is some determinate number [of the types of soul], and [all the types of soul] are of some one
kind or another. Just as the types of soul have been discriminated, so there exists some determinate
number of types of speeches, each one a particular kind. Hence a certain type of person is easy to
persuade by a certain type of speech to take such and such action for such and such reason, while
another type is hard to persuade for other particular reasons. Having understood these things
sufficiently, the student must then observe them as they actually occur and are put into practice,
and he must be able to follow them with keen perception, or otherwise get no advantage from his
previous instruction. But when he is competent to say what type of person is persuaded by what
types of speech, and when, catching sight of someone, he can tell himself that this is the person
and this is the nature which was discussed previously, now actually there before him, upon whom
he must now apply these particular speeches in this way to persuade him of these particular
things; when he now has all of this, and has furthermore grasped the opportunities for speaking
57
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and for keeping quiet, and has come to recognize the right and wrong opportunities for
brachylogy, evocation of pity, exacerbation, and all the types of speeches he may learn—then the
technē has been well and completely achieved, but not before then. 62

In this passage Plato stresses the practical necessity of knowing the inextricable link
between rhetoric and the psychological category of the auditors. In explaining the link, he
places emphasis on both the practical and particular aspects involved in persuasive logos.
Given the psychological variability of different types of soul, these are aspects which the
rhētōr will inevitably encounter, and must therefore master. Moreover, the above passage
is of utmost importance if we are to understand Plato’s implicit emphasis on the
adaptability and creativity of instructive logos that is persuasive. If we pay attention to
the implications of this passage, we would come to the conclusion that this creativity is,
in addition to knowing the psychological-rhetorical aspects of instructive speech,
necessary if the auditors are to be persuaded of what they ought to be persuaded of. This
creates leeway for the ultimate conclusion that persuasion, according to Plato, could not
be achieved unless the rhētōr acquires the capability of producing generative logos—
speech that serves to impart knowledge in a practical setting by having been based on 1)
the psychological category of the auditors; and 2) the particular circumstances that the
rhētōr is unavoidably faced with.
This makes clear for us a crucial point of commonality between the rhetorical
theories given by Plato and Aristotle. While Aristotle asserts that rhetoric is the
“counterpart of dialectic” and Plato incorporates dialectical discourse with deliberative
rhetoric, the two converge on the idea that persuasive logos can be used to inform the
reason of the auditor. Aristotle’s distinction between rhetoric and dialectic is based on the
dichotomy he posits between the art of public speaking and the art of logical discourse.
Plato takes a bold step by dissolving this dichotomy and by so doing making dialectic and
rhetorical logos complementary to one another.
The point of commonality, as I have endeavored to show, can best be defined and
characterized by the generation of creatively flexible logos that is sensitive to the
particular situation the rhētōr must mould his speech to. In this sense the rhētōr uses
logos in order to activate the rational faculty of the auditors, and by so doing, enhancing
virtue amongst them. So while Plato and Aristotle diverge from one another on whether
or not rhetorical persuasion can be achieved dialectically, they evidently converge on the
most effective way persuasion ought to be effected: by emphasizing the fluidity of
persuasive speech—a fluidity that can adapt to the spontaneously-generated realities of
democracy—they both see generative language as being a solution to the spontaneity of
the dēmos. The two philosophers would hence agree with Thucydides that instructional
rhetoric is the best way to impose stable, long-term policy on the unstable arrangement of
democratic deliberation. 63 Having established this point, let us now turn to the important
issue of emotional motivation, which must be addressed in order to gain a better
understanding of the subject at hand.
7. LOGOS AND THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION

62
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Phdr. 271B—72A, as quoted in Yunis (1996, pp. 202-03), emphasis mine.
See Yunis (1996, pp. 150-151).
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Whether or not reason and emotion can complement one another or clash in the context
of practical decision-making has been a central question from the time of antiquity. It is a
question that still stimulates the minds of many and has therefore produced notable
literature. In concurrence with the Platonic notion that emotions (or at least some of
them) can play a role in controlling the beast in us if subservient to rationality, along with
the Aristotelian view that passionate motivation can inform one’s reason, Ronald de
Sousa has presented a noteworthy analysis. He contends that “[…] when the calculi of
reason have become sufficiently sophisticated, they would be powerless in their own
terms, except for the contribution of emotion.” 64 The question is whether or not this can
be true in a joint Platonic-Aristotelian theory of rhetoric, which, as has been shown
above, can be posited through some of the tacitly-shared views of the two philosophers.
As a dualist, Plato posits a clear qualification as to when emotion can play a
positive role: it must necessarily be subject to pure rationality. Moreover, he gives us a
tri-partite postulation of the soul, about which he says that the emotional part normally
sides with the rational. Plato, however, is notoriously unclear on his position; while he
claims that the emotional normally sides with the rational, he gives us other arguments
based on the capacity of children to have emotive experience, intended to tell us that the
emotional is not to be equated with the rational. 65 One may, however, offer a simple point
to substantiate the idea that the emotional complements the rational: without emotion
there would be nothing to be rational about. 66 This point is subtle yet clearly evident in
the passage quoted above, in which Plato refers to recognizing the right and wrong
opportunities for the evocation of pity.
We have already established that Plato offers a revised view toward rhetoric in the
Phaedrus, whereby he emphasizes its instructive potential and its ability to persuade by
reasoning; he says that the expert can use the same method, 67 reasoning, to win authority
amongst the auditors as he would amongst philosophers. The rhētōr, Plato asserts, must
do so by “shaping the instructive message of a speech and presenting it to the auditor’s
understanding in such a way that it will compel—even when the auditor is not a
philosopher and is not capable of understanding what a philosopher can understand.” 68
We have also pointed out that without the emotional there could be nothing to be rational
about; Plato’s reference to the evocation of pity, therefore, must necessarily imply that
evoking this emotion can help the rhētōr persuade his auditors—this evocation, we may
infer, would in Plato’s eyes complement the rhētōr’s task of persuading the audience by
using reasoning.
This complementary relation between reason and emotion can be discerned within
the analysis put forth by Leo Strauss. Pointing to Socrates’ use of rhetorical skill to
describe Thrasymachus, Strauss postulates on the significance of the interaction between
Socrates and Glaucon:
The Rationality of Emotion (1987 & 2001: MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), p. xv.
See ibid, p. 27.
66
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What Socrates does in the Thrasymachus section would be inexcusable if he had not done it in
order to provoke the passionate reaction of Glaucon, a reaction which he presents as entirely
unexpected. According to his presentation Glaucon, who was responsible for Socrates’ staying in
the Piraeus (not to say for his descending to the Piraeus), is responsible also for the bulk of the
Republic, for the elaboration of the best city. 69

Possessing courage, Glaucon desires to see Socrates defend justice for its own
sake and not for its purpose. In this sense, “while Socrates is responsible for the fact that
justice is the theme of the conversation, Glaucon is responsible for the manner in which it
is treated.” 70 From this interaction we can infer that Socrates can be seen to represent
reason and reasoning while Glaucon’s character is representative of emotion. Strauss
does not hesitate to present Glaucon as representative of emotion:
Glaucon looks into the hearts, and if someone would say that one cannot look into all men’s
hearts, we shall limit ourselves to saying that Glaucon has looked into his own heart and has found
there injustice struggling manfully with his good breeding. 71

Furthermore, Glaucon’s character can be seen as being complementary to reason—a
character which typifies him as: “The most spirited speaker in the work, who as
Spiritedness incarnate comes to the assistance of Reason in the founding of the just
city.” 72 But this “assistance” of reason may actually be presented in the form of
compulsion, i.e. forcefully guiding reason to face the question of establishing a just city;
it is the same Glaucon whom, through his manliness and spiritedness, compels Socrates
to return to the fundamental question of the possibility of a just city. 73
Strauss points to the interesting suggestion that Socrates, by apparently having
digressed to the topic of war, compels Glaucon to compel him to return to the main
question. 74 It is in this sense that we may perceive a corresponding relationship between
reason and passion. Within the context of the interaction between Socrates and Glaucon,
one can make the plausible assertion that reason has articulated emotion but requires it
in order to demonstrate itself. When the skills and traits of Socrates and Glaucon are
combined, we are afforded the opportunity to see a balancing, harmonizing synthesis
between reason and emotion—a synthesis that is essentially one of the skills and traits of
the two characters. Glaucon is passionately motivated by Socrates’ use of rhetorical
reasoning and subsequently motivates the source of his own motivation to prove what he
emotes, which is, as has been shown, spirited conviction toward justice. 75
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This creates leeway for us to postulate another link between the rhetorical theories
of Plato and Aristotle, this time with regard to the role emotion can play in persuasion.
Aristotle tells us that “thinking by itself moves nothing”; reason alone is therefore
insufficient in ethical and political decision-making. 76 Ethical virtue, therefore, must
come out of reason and emotion working in unison, or, in Aristotle’s term, in
“symphony.” Aristotle tells us that virtuous action needs reason and emotion both
choosing the same action; otherwise, the action would not be deemed ethically virtuous.
In the context of democratic deliberation, therefore, appealing to the emotions of the
audience is indispensable in order for virtue to be enhanced. But is there a particular
quality about the emotions that would fit with the idea of generative logos? Could the
rhētōr, in effect, “shape” or “mould” the emotions to fit his intention of enhancing virtue
and brining stability to the polis?
Aristotle points out that there is no such thing as a “moral emotion.” In
explicating this, Sokolon provides an instructive summation:
[…] anger, love, hate, fear, and pity, can be conducive to virtuous action and justice when, in
partnership with reason, they are habituated to ethical choice. The same innate emotions at the
wrong time and for the wrong reasons can lead to blamable and vicious action. 77

In other words, “[e]motions are Janus-like; they look both ways and, depending upon the
particular circumstances and the guidance of reason, can be positive or negative for
individual prospering and collective political good.” 78 If we find grounds to accept
Aristotle’s explanation, we would find that emotions are therefore “neutral” in my sense
of the term: they serve neither virtue nor vice, but can be excited in order to do so. They
have no loyalty to any particular belief or ideology, and can, together with generative
logos, be used to lead to either ethical or unethical action, depending on whether the
logos used is deceptive or not. The implication is that the speaker can in effect shape his
appeal to the emotions of the audience to be geared to either ethical or unethical action.
As Sokolon points out, a single emotion, pity, for example, can be used to motivate good
or bad action; if it results in unethical action, it is therefore not the emotion itself that is
blamable but rather the action that has resulted thereof. This shows us that much like the
art of rhetoric, human emotions, which are innate, are in effect neutral in my impression
of the term.
In addition, there are naturally many particular cases in which virtue can be
enhanced using a single emotion. In other words, the evocation of pity, for instance, can
motivate more than one type of virtuous act. In this sense, it is amorphous and can be
mobilized to lead the auditor to virtue in cases where particular circumstances are
different. It is, in effect, adaptable to different situations. There is no reason why the same
could not be said of any other emotion. Anger, for instance, can be used to lead the
audience to more than one type of virtuous action in more than one type of situation.
This analysis demonstrates that rhetorical logos and human emotion share the trait
of being amorphous and hence adaptable to the particular case at hand. It is indicative
that this same trait is shared by the process of democratic governance whereby a
formless, unstructured approach characterizes political decision-making. The point of
76
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making this parallel is to show that when combined, two amorphous things, namely
emotion-motivating rhetoric and democracy, can, in line with what Thucydides believed,
create the very opposite of amorphousness: consistent, reliable, and stable governance.
8. RHETORIC, EMOTIONAL MOTIVATION, AND FORCE
Though Aristotle rejects the connection between rhetoric and tyranny 79 , Plato is careful
to give a qualification: while in the Phaedrus he boldly expresses the instructive potential
of rhetoric, he is sure to distinguish between non-deceptive logos, which can improve the
dēmos, and deceptive logos, which he parallels with tyranny. 80 This qualification,
however, would not impede us from saying that the two philosophers saw non-deceptive
rhetoric as a tool to improve the masses. Because Plato rules out force and revolutionary
methods, and because the dēmos would have no reason to just obey a political expert who
claims he is ready to rule, he insists on persuading the masses to bring his ideal polis into
being. 81 His disgust with violence and revolutionary means in achieving political ends,
therefore, is congruent with his view that rhetoric can be used to enhance virtue in the
polis. Lamenting that “most tyrants have begun their careers as demagogues,” 82 Aristotle,
incidentally, sympathizes with Plato and grieves that:
At Cos democracy was overthrown by the rise of discreditable demagogues and the combination
of the notables against them. The same thing happened at Rhodes, where the demagogues first
introduced a system of payment, and then withheld the sums due to the trierarchs; the result was
that the trierarchs, vexed by the suits brought against them, were compelled to combine and
overthrow the democracy. At Heraclea democracy was ruined by the behavior of the demagogues
soon after the colony was founded. They treated the notables unjustly, and drove them out by their
conduct; but the notables gathered their forces, returned, and overthrew the democracy. 83

The common theme that can be established here is the use of rhetoric for the avoidance of
force in accomplishing political aims and, ultimately, of tyranny. This is a shared feeling
amongst the two philosophers and can help us in theorizing a universal PlatonicAristotelian approach to rhetorical logos. Plato, quintessentially, is concerned with
avoiding the use of revolutionary methods by using something, i.e. rhetoric, that can itself
be paralleled to tyranny; Plato puts rhetoric at the disposal of the political expert much
like putting a well-trained wolfhound to guard sheep—a wolfhound that, by its nature,
can be vicious because it is in the same family as the wolf, but useful because its nature
has been moulded for a good purpose, namely guarding sheep by guiding their
spontaneously unpredictable movement. We could read Aristotle as certainly being
Pol. 1305A7-15.
See Philebus, 58B.
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supportive of this. Once the two philosophers establish the difference between good and
bad rhetoric, they find themselves in concurrence with one another: they tell us that nondeceptive rhetorical logos, produced generatively and in a de-structured, de-arranged
manner, can be used to inform the reason of the auditor, and, by so doing, facilitate the
enhancement of virtue and arrange for the stable “taming of democracy.” Herein lies the
paradox.
9. CONCLUSION
This paper has been the product of an attempt to posit a theoretical link between the
rhetorical theories of Plato and Aristotle. While the philosophies of the two thinkers
essentially diverge from one another in approach, they find, based on their mutual
disapproval of democracy, common ground in rhetoric. This common ground, which I
have attempted to characterize as “generative logos,” becomes evident when we analyze
Plato’s modified view toward rhetoric and compare it to what Aristotle tells us about the
usefulness of the art of persuasion. My analysis above attempts to demonstrate the
edifying potential of rhetoric in an unstructured political setting, whereby decisions are
rendered en masse after intense deliberation. I have made an effort to create a conceptual
link between this unstructured political setting and the essential quality of rhetoric.
Despite the reality that both democratic governance and rhetoric are shapeless, when
combined, they have the potential of facilitating enduring, long-term policy that would
enhance the virtue of the dēmos. With some qualifications, a careful analysis of the
thought of Plato and Aristotle supports this conclusion.
My ultimate endeavour is to help discover a universal Platonic-Aristotelian theory
of rhetoric that can help us better understand the instructive potential of persuasive
language. Moreover, I believe it is essential to ask whether or not the exercise of political
power in a democratic setting could be understood without a comprehensively
interdisciplinary approach referring to the fields of linguistics and psychology, among
others. If the analysis above is sound and can stand to reason, then we may infer that the
idea of generative language is quite relevant to the study of politics. In my view the
connection between generative language and exploring a Platonic-Aristotelian concept of
virtue achieved through political rhetoric is anything but tenuous. Proving the strength of
this connection, however, remains a task which would need our perpetual commitment.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I am indebted to Professors Newman, Sokolon, and Tindale
for their valuable comments on previous drafts.
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